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CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

nant in the bond to pay the amount of all damage sustained, and
the measure of the liability having been specified at the penal sum
of $1,000, the Appellate Court for the First District rather quickly
concluded that the obligor could not be held, either in debt or in
assumpsit, for anything more than the penalty amount. In Davis
v. Moore," on the other hand, the obligee under an appeal bond
given in connection with a forcible entry and detainer suit2 2 was
permitted to bring suit to have the bond reformed to include a
covenant to pay the rent accruing during the pendency of the case,
and to then enforce such covenant, on the theory that all statutory
requirements concerning appeal bonds are parts of the bond
whether recited therein or not. A judgment in favor of the obligee
for the amount of the unpaid rent as well as for costs in relation
to the appeal was affirmed by the Appellate Court for the Fourth
District.
III. CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
AVAILABILITY OF REMEDIES

Cases illustrating the structure of the judicial department of
the state, or the functions to be performed by judicial officials,
are relatively rare but could be of profound importance since it is
basic law that courts and judges may validly act only in their respective jurisdictional spheres.' In that connection, it had one
time been understood that Illinois courts were denied the right to
entertain jurisdiction over wrongful death cases involving nonresidents, based on deaths occurring outside the state, except in
those instances where a denial of jurisdictional power could result
in a denial of relief.2 That view had been exposed to a degree of
criticism as the result of the outcome of two earlier cases, one
arising under a comparable statute of a sister state3 and the other
217 Ill. App. (2d) 519, 130 N. E. (2d) 117 (1955).
22 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 57, § 20.
1 An instance of the seldom used original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may
be found in the case of People ex rel. Castle v. Daniels, 8 Ill. (2d) 43, 132 N. E.

(2d) 507 (1956).

2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 70, § 2.

3 Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U. S. 609, 71 S. Ct. 980, 95 L. Ed. 1212 (1961), noted in
30 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEw

174.
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4
coming up through a federal court sitting in Illinois, but it was
not openly attacked, so far as Illinois state courts were concerned,
until the institution of the case of Allendorf v. Elgin, Joliet &
Eastern Railway Company." The Illinois Supreme Court there
decided that the statutory limitation on wrongful death cases invoked by the defendant was unconstitutional and, as a result of
so holding, has now recognized a form of case jurisdiction in the
state trial court which was not heretofore open to use.

Powers of county courts located within the state' were discussed in three separate cases. In People ex rel. Andrews v.
Hassakis,7 the Supreme Court held such courts powerless to suspend an attorney from practicing therein on the ground they lack
specific statutory authority on the point s and possessed no inherent
authority in this respect. It was said, in the confiscation proceeding entitled People v. 123 Punch Boards,9 however, that county
courts could exercise quasi-criminal powers without reference to
the value of the property sought to be destroyed as contraband
for the maximum monetary jurisdictional limit placed on such
courts 0 applied solely to the jurisdiction in relation to civil suits
in which claims for damages were advanced. Similarly, in People
v. Gentry," the Appellate Court for the Third District held the
criminal jurisdiction of county courts extended to prosecutions
for vagrancy 2 on the theory the jurisdiction of such courts was
equated with that conferred on lesser judicial officials, such as
4 First Nat. Bank of Chicago v. United Air Lines, 342 U. S. 396, 72 S. Ct. 421,
96 L. Ed. 441 (1952), noted in 31 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REvIw 27.
58 Ill. (2d) 164, 133 N. E. (2d) 288 (1956). Klingbiel, J., wrote a dissenting
opinion. Petition for certiorari has been denied: - U. S. -, 77 S. Ct. 49, 1 L. Ed.
(2d) (adv.) 53 (1956).
6 In general, see Ill. Const. 1870, Art. VI, §§ 1 and 18, and Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955,
Vol. 1, Ch. 37, § 171 et seq.
7 6 111. (2d) 463, 129 N. E. (2d) 9 (1955).
8 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 13, § 6, restricts the power to strike the name
of an attorney from the roll of lawyers to the justices of the Supreme Court, but
it does permit a judge of a circuit court, or of the Superior Court of Cook County.
to order a period of suspension from practice before these tribunals.
9 11 Ill. App. (2d) 31, 135 N. E. (2d) 820 (1956).
10 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 37, § 177.
1110 Inl. App. (2d) 142, 134 N. E. (2d) 367 (1956).
12 Prosecutions of this nature are authorized by Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch.
38, §§ 578-9.
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justices of the peace and police magistrates, whose powers in this
respect were not exclusive.
Lesser state judicial officials were reminded, by two cases,
that they may have obligations to perform as well as possess
powers which they may not heretofore have suspected. Thus, in
People v. Reiner" the Supreme Court held that it was the responsibility of a police magistrate to report convictions for drunken
driving to the Secretary of State, in order to permit him to perform his duty with respect to the suspension of the driving license, 14 and that a palpable omission of this duty 5 could well
involve the magistrate in a criminal prosecution. 6 A claim there
advanced that the requirement as to making reports imposed a
non-judicial duty on a judicial officer in violation of the constitutional provision as to separation of powers 7 was rejected as calling for a too jealous regard for the time and energy of judicial
officers. In the case of Stark v. Stark,' however, a master in
chancery was held empowered to investigate a question relating to
custody of children of parties to a divorce proceeding, despite the
absence of specific authority in the statute on the subject." The
case quite probably turned on the fact that the report of the
master was no more than one of advisory character for it could
not be said that work of this nature falls within the inherent
powers of masters.
Venue requirements, as well as jurisdictional limitations,
should be observed if a given court is to have authority to proceed
with the case. In three separate instances during the year, defendants urged that venue requirements had been violated but in each
instance the court found no error had been committed in connection with the choice of the county in which to institute suit. In
13 6 Ill. (2d) 337, 129 N. E. (2d) 159 (1955).
14 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2. Ch. 95%, § 73.30.
15 Ibid., Ch. 95%, § 73.32.
16 Ibid., Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 449.
17 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. III.
187 Ill. App. (2d) 442, 129 N. E. (2d) 776 (1955).
denied.
19 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 40, § 19.

Leave to appeal has been
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the case of People ex rel. Carpentierv. Lange,20 a suit to collect
additional truck license fees, the licensee contended that suit could
be maintained only in the county of his residence, from whence
21
he had mailed his license application, but the Supreme Court,
on noting that the application had been received at and acted
upon in the office of the Secretary of State at the state capital,
held the acts done there constituted at least a part of the transaction "out of which the cause of action arose," 22 hence concluded
that suit in Sangamon County was not inappropriate. The place
where the breach of contract occurred was held to be controlling
in the case of Bagarozy v. Meneghini,23 rather than the place
where the contract had been entered into, since until breach occurred there was no "transaction" giving rise to a cause of
action.2 4
The issue in the case of Gordon v. Gordon 5 was slightly different. The plaintiff therein, a resident of Cook County, sued
there for separate maintenance from her non-resident husband2 6
and endeavored to enforce her right to support by sequestration
proceedings directed against certain banks and trust companies,
also resident in Cook County, which held assets belonging to her
husband. One such trust company, holding title to land in Kane
20 8 In. (2d) 437, 134 N. E. (2d) 266 (1956).
21 Direct appeal to the Supreme Court was proper, pursuant to Ill. Rev. Stat.
1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 75, as the case involved a question concerning the state
revenue.
22 111. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 5.
28 8 Ini. App. (2d) 285, 131 N. E. (2d) 79 (1955).
24 The contract had been made in New York by a resident thereof with an opera
singer who, at time of suit, was domiciled in Italy. The breach occurred when the
singer performed in an opera given in Chicago without securing plaintiff's permission and without paying plaintiff his managerial commission. The defendant also
claimed the action violated a principle related to venue matters described as the
doctrine of forum non conveniens, relying particularly on the case of Whitney v.
Madden, 400 Inl. 185, 79 N. B. (2d) 593 (1948), and arguing that the matter was
easily determinable in the courts of Italy. The Appellate Court for the First
District, however, found a difference between the two situations in that, in the
Whitney case, the plaintiff had an appropriate forum in a sister state whereas, in
the case at hand, the plaintiff would have been relegated to the courts of a foreign
country. The court held that it would be inappropriate to force an American
citizen to sue outside of the United States on a cause of action which arose therein.
256 InI. (2d) 572, 129 N. E. (2d) 706 (1955).
26 Venue In Cook County would be unquestionably correct as to this aspect of the
case: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 68, § 22.
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County in trust for the husband's benefit, resisted a sequestration
decree on the ground the action should have been conducted in the
last-named county, claiming that, since title to land was involved,
the suit appropriately belonged in the county "where the real
estate or some part of it" was located." Recognizing that if the
suit had been one in which the title to land had been directly concerned the venue requirement would have been violated, the Supreme Court nevertheless held that, as the relief sought was of
in personam character to-wit: the execution of a deed by the
trustee, the problem was one with respect to venue limitations in
relation to parties rather than property, and it approved the
plaintiff's choice as to venue.2
Acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
is another essential element to the effective conduct of a suit.
Such jurisdiction is usually obtained by the proper service of
process which correctly names the defendant and furnishes him
with pertinent information so that he could know when and where
to appear. Misnomer of a defendant may provide a basis for
objection to the further conduct of the proceedings but, according
to the case of Janove v. Brown,2 9 if a summons bearing an incorrect designation for a defendant is served on the person intended
to be sued, he may not neglect the notice so given and claim that
the judgment pronounced against him is void, for jurisdiction over
30
him would be acquired by the fact of service.
When substitute personal service is attempted, strict compliance with statutory requirements is usually demanded for due
process might well be denied if too liberal an interpretation were
to prevail. The case of Dalton v. Alexander,3 therefore, should
27 111. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 7(2).
28 Ibid., Ch. 110, § 5, was held to be the controlling provision.
296 111. (2d) 245, 128 N. E.

(2d) 706 (1955).

30 The court also there noted that the fact a corporation had been dissolved by
judicial order more than two years before suit had been instituted against it did
not necessarily render the service, and the judgment based thereon, absolutely void
since the corporation may have been continued with de facto existence sufficient to
permit suit. The holding may be said to be colored by the fact that the rights of a
purchaser at a judicial sale based on the judgment had intervened.
3110 Ill. App. (2d) 273, 135 N. E. (2d) 101 (1956). Leave to appeal has been
denied.
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serve as a reminder to the bar that the so-called "long arm"
statute relating to service of process on non-resident automobile
drivers "2 is limited in its application to persons who use and operate motor vehicles over the highways of the state.3 3 It may not,
therefore, be invoked to support the acquisition of jurisdiction
over the bailor of a vehicle, as was attempted in that case, provided it is made to appear that the bailor neither drove in person
nor through an agent and had, as his only connection with the
events, the fact of his ownership of the car in question. In the
case of Anchor Finance Corporation v. Miller,3 4 by contrast, the
statutory reference to service of process on "some person of the
family" of the individual defendant" was given a fairly liberal
construction by the Appellate Court for the First District in a
case where the summons was handed to a married sister of the
defendant, in his absence, after she responded to the ringing of
the doorbell at the defendant's apartment. While the sister actually resided in another apartment in the same building, the court
elected to treat her as a member of the defendant's "family" for
this purpose and upheld the service.",
Despite the emphasis given by the apparently mandatory language of the revised Civil Practice Act on the subject of the time
of making the demand for jury trial, 7 a point to be watched quite
early in litigation, the courts appear to have been fairly liberal
in the matter of allowing late demands, particularly where the
rights of a defendant would otherwise be in jeopardy.38 The
significance of the holding in the case of Hudson v. Leverenz, 9
11. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 95/2, § 23.
Jones v. Pebler, 371 Ill. 309, 20 N. E. (2d) 592, 125 A. L. R. 451 (1939).
348 Ii1. App. (2d) 326, 132 N. E. (2d) 81 (1956). Leave to appeal has been
denied.
35 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 13.2.
36 The holding would seem, in some degree, to be strengthened by the fact that
the defendant admitted receiving a copy of the summons by mail and thereby
gained personal knowledge of the pending action, together with the additional fact
that the sister received her mail, and frequently ate her meals, at the location of
the defendant's apartment.
37 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 64(1), states that a plaintiff "must file a
demand" at the time the action is commenced and that a defendant, desirous of a
trial by jury, must make his demand "not later than the filing of his answer."
38 Stephens v. Kasten, 383 Ill. 127, 48 N. E. (2d) 508 (1943).
399 Ill. App. (2d) 96, 132 N. E. (2d) 427 (1956).
32

33
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therefore, lies not so much in the fact that the Appellate Court
for the Third District there held it to be error for the trial
court to deny to a defendant an opportunity to make a late demand as in the reasons assigned for that holding. The court there
seized upon other portions of the statute and the accompanying
rules, designed to authorize the granting of extensions of time in
appropriate situations, 4° as being indicative of a purpose to leave
this point open to an exercise of a degree of discretion.
Attention should, of course, be given to applicable statutes of
limitation for the effect that they may have on the contemplated
litigation. In that connection, two landmark decisions have been
achieved by the Supreme Court within the past year. A long step
toward the clearing of land titles from possibilities of reverter
and rights of re-entry was taken when the court, in the case of
Trustees of Schools of Township No. 1 v. Batdorf, 1 upheld both
the constitutionality and the retroactive effect of the 1947 addition
to the Conveyances Act 42 which had not only placed a time limitation on the potential duration of such interests but had also fixed
a relatively short period, one year after the enactment thereof, for
the bringing of suit on old breaches which may have brought reversions into existence or given rise to rights of re-entry. 43 Under
the holding in the case of Smith v. Carlson,4 4 the court treated the
scire facias proceeding to revive an earlier judgment 5 as being no
different than a separate suit in debt based on that judgment, 48
hence regarded the former as being sufficiently instituted to obviate
the limitation period when the judgment creditor had caused the
scire facias writ to be issued within an appropriate time even
40 111. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 59 and § 101.8(5).
41 6 Ill. (2d) 486, 130 N. E. (2d) 111 (1955), noted In 34 CHIaAGo-KENT LAw
REvimw 250.
42 Laws 1947, p. 659; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 30, § 37b et seq.
43 The period of limitation as to future causes may vary from not less than
seven years to as much as twenty years: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 83, §§ 1,
la, and lb.
448 Ill. (2d) 74, 132 N. E. (2d) 513 (1956), noted in 34 CHnoAao-KENT LAW
REvIEw 257, reversing 6 Ill. App. (2d) 271, 127 N. E. (2d) 257 (1955).
45 Il1. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 83, § 24b.
46 Ibid., Vol. 2, Ch. 110 § 55.
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though the actual revival itself did not occur until after the
statutory period had expired.
The proper or improper selection of parties, both plaintiffs
and defendants, could have profound consequences on the outcome
of planned litigation. Little of significance has been said with
regard to the proper persons to be plaintiffs 47 but some points
have been made with respect to nonjoinder and misjoinder of
defendants. Thus, in the case of Babington v. County Board of
School Trustees, 48 a proceeding to secure review of administrative
action under a petition for the detachment of school territory, it
was said that all signers of the petition were necessary parties
defendant and, as a consequence, the case could not proceed without their presence.49 By contrast, in two related cases,50 while
the court could find no error in permitting a number of distinct
and separate plaintiffs to combine in one equity proceeding to
secure injunctive relief against certain blasting operations,5' it
did sustain an objection predicated on a misjoinder of defendants
when it found an absence of joint or collective action by the several
quarry owners, who in fact were competitors, after it was made
to appear that none of them had knowledge of or control over the
activities of the others. Mention could also be made of the holding
of a local federal district court in the case of Torcazo v. Stateina.52
47 The Appellate Court for the First District, in the case of United Mail Order,
etc., Local 20 v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 6 Ill. App. (2d) 477, 128 N. E. (2d) 645
(1955), reiterated the proposition that a suit could not be conducted in the name
of an unincorporated union for lack of a legal entity distinct from the members
thereof. The Supreme Court, when affirming the decision therein, dealt solely with
principles of substantive law and made no reference to the procedural point: 9 Ill.
(2d) 101, 137 N. E. (2d) 47 (1956).
48 7 Ill. App. (2d) 193, 129 N. E. (2d) 291 (1955).
49 The court noted that the legislature, when enacting the Administrative Review
Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 264 et seq., made no provision therein
for any form of representation by parties before the court, possibly because a
simplified and inexpensive method of service of process by the use of registered
mail had been devised.
50 Dorsey v. Material Service Corp., 9 Ill. App. (2d) 428, 133 N. B. (2d) 730
(1956), and Opal v. Material Service Corp., 9 Ill. App. (2d) 433, 133 N. U. (2d)
733 (1956).
51 The court preferred the liberal view illustrated by the New York case of
Akely v. Kinnicutt, 238 N. Y. 466, 144 N. E. 682 (1924), to the more confining rule
as to multifariousness applied by the Appellate Court for the Second District in
the case of Gombi v. Taylor Washing Machine Co., 290 IIl. App. 53, 7 N. E. (2d)
929 (1937).
52141 F. Supp. 769 (1956).
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The court there permitted the joinder of a Wisconsin insurance
company as a defendant in an automobile collision case which
arose in that state not so much because the "direct action" statute of Wisconsin 53 was applicable, it being simply procedural in
character, but because another statutory provision, 4 deemed to be
a part of the insurance contract, was treated as creating a direct
liability in favor of the plaintiff under substantive contract prin,ciples.55
Parties also get into litigation in other ways than by naming
them in the first instance. Intervention provides one such illustration, 56 but intervention is not allowed unless the petitioner can
disclose an interest in himself with respect to the subject matter
of the suit. It was, therefore, held in the case of Art Institute of
Chicago v. Castle 7 that it was proper to deny to a private party
leave to intervene as a plaintiff in a case affecting the administration of a public charitable trust because the exclusive right to
5s
conduct suits of this nature is vested in the Attorney General
and that which a private litigant would not be permitted to do by
direct action would not be permitted by indirection. The scope of
intervention does, however, appear to have been liberalized for, in
the case of Steiner v. Rig-A-Jig Toy Company,59 there would appear to be a tacit recognition of the fact that intervention is now
to be permitted in law actions where, heretofore, the subject was
one generally of equitable rather than of legal cognizance.6 0 Specific statutory authority may also exist for intervention in parWis. Stat. 1953, § 260.11.
Ibid., § 85.93.
55 Note might also be taken of the holding in the case of Romadka v. Schroff,
7 Ill. (2d) 202, 130 N. E. (2d) 277 (1955), for the length to which the court went
to sustain a decree alleged to be erroneous for lack of proper parties when it could
have disposed of that aspect of the problem by a simple reference to Il1. Rev. Stat.
1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 42(3).
56 The subject is now regulated by Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 26.1.
See the case of Dowsett v. City of East Moline, 8 Ill. (2d) 560, 134 N. E. (2d) 793
(1956), for a practical construction of clause 6 thereof.
57 9 Ill. App. (2d) 473, 133 N. E. (2d) 748 (1956).
58 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 14, § 4.
53
54

59 10 Ill. App. (2d) 410, 135 N. E. (2d)
denied.
60 39 Am. Jur., Parties, § 55 et seq.

166 (1956).

Leave to appeal has been
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ticular types of proceedings, as is the case where an employer,
after the payment of workmen's compensation, is allowed to intervene in his employee's suit against a third person to recover damages for the disabling injury with the thought in mind that the
employer could, in that fashion, be able to protect his lien for
reimbursement of the compensation paid.6 After some uncertainty as to the manner by which the employer's right should be
afforded protection, 62 a sensible solution appears to have been
achieved through the medium of the case of Sjoberg v. Joseph T.
Ryerson & Son2 where the court directed that leave to intervene
should be granted to the employer but subject to the condition that
the intervenor should not participate in the conduct of the employee's suit unless with the plaintiff's consent. In the case of
Dillon v. Nathan,64 however, the statutory right of lien with its
corresponding right of intervention was held to be inadequate in
relation to a suit against a third person based upon the Dram
Shop Act65 inasmuch as suits of that character do not rest upon
the inflicting of negligent injury upon the employee. 6
Ordinary legal remedies have gone without change except that,
in the case of White v. Prenzler,67 the statutory limitations placed
upon suits for breach of promise to marry were given a liberal
construction so as to permit to a plantiff a full three month period
61 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 138.5.
62 Compare the cases of Manion v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. R. Co., 2 II. App. (2d)
191, 119 N. E. (2d) 498 (1954), and Hyland v. 79 West Monroe Corp., 2 Ii. App.
(2d) 83, 118 N. E. (2d) 636 (1954).
638 Ill. App. (2d) 414, 132 N. E. (2d) 56 (1956), noted In 34 OHIOAGO-KENT LAW
RmiEW.W 269.

64 10 Ill. App. (2d) 289, 135 N. E. (2d) 136 (1956). Leave to appeal has been
denied.
65 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 43, § 135. For that matter, according to the
case of New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Gerin, 9 Ill. App. (2d) 545, 133 N. E.
(2d) 723 (1956), an insurance company may not claim reimbursement by way of
subrogation in dram shop situations.
66 A sound illustration of the inherent danger which provoked a revision of the
Civil Practice Act in relation to suits by subrogees, now embodied in Ill. Rev. Stat.
1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 22(4), can be found in the case of Knigge v. Berenz, 10 Ill.
App. (2d) 181, 134 N. E. (2d) 626 (1956).
677 Ill. (2d) 624, 131 N. E. (2d) 540 (1956). Direct appeal was taken to the
Supreme Court as the constitutionality of Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 89, § 29,
dealing with notice as a condition precedent in breach of promise to marry cases,
had been placed in issue. The Supreme Court was, however, able to dispose of the
case without reaching the constitutional question.
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measured from the time of knowledge of breach in which to give
notice of the contemplated action rather than three months from
the date when the actual breach occurred and, in Miller v. Siwicki,"8
the court again referred to the fact that equitable defenses, such
as laches, are now available for use in ejectment actions. For
that matter, little has been said about statutory remedies although
9 may
the case of County Board of School Trustees v. Batchelder"
serve to illustrate the rather slender degree of effort on the part
of the condemning authority which may be regarded as sufficient
to meet the condition precedent to a proceeding under the Eminent
Domain Act to the effect that the action should be instituted only
after the compensation to be paid "cannot be agreed upon by the
parties interested. ' 7 The case of Pasfield v. Donovan71 should
also prove to be of interest for the Illinois Supreme Court there
upheld that portion of the Cities and Villages Act which permits
a plaintiff who succeeds in restraining a violation of the zoning
law to recover a reasonable sum for attorney's fees as part of
the costs. 72 Brief mention could also be made of the case of
Exchange National Bank of Chicago v. County of Cook73 since it
serves to emphasize as well as to illustrate the nature of the important "actual controversy" which must exist between the parties
before resort may be had to a proceeding for a declaratory judg74
ment.
In the field of equity and equitable remedies, the question as
to whether or not jurisdiction should be exercised persistently reappears, often in novel form, and the past year was no exception.
The question became particularly acute in the case of Burden v.
Hoover 75 where certain licensed chiropractors sought an injunc58 8 Ill. (2d) 362, 134 N. E. (2d) 321 (1956).
69 7 Ill. (2d) 178, 130 N. E. (2d) 175 (1955).
70 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 47, § 2.
717 Ii.
(2d) 563, 131 N. E. (2d) 504 (1956).
72 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 24, § 73--9.
73 6 Ill. (2d) 419, 129 N. E. (2d) 1 (1955).
74 11. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 57.1.
75 7 Ill. App. (2d) 296, 12 N. E. (2d) 463 (1955). The Illinois Supreme Court,
not in the period of this survey, later reversed the holding therein and remanded
the cause for further proceedings: 9 Ill. (2d) 114, 137 N. E. (2d) 59 (1956).
Daily, J., and Bristow, J., each wrote a dissenting opinion.

SURVEY OF ILLINOIS LAW-1955-1956

tion against unlicensed operators in order to prevent them from
carrying on practice in the community. Both the trial court and
the Appellate Court for the Fourth District denied relief, primarily on the ground the suit was not one to protect property
rights, for which equity could take jurisdiction, but was more
nearly designed to enjoin the doing of an act which was subject
to criminal punishment, 76 hence came within an area where equitable jurisdiction would be lacking. The Supreme Court, however,
reversed these holdings when it declared that a person who holds
a license to practice as a chiropractor, like other licensed professional persons, 7 has a property right in such license in the nature
of a franchise which would be entitled to receive equitable protection.
If a property right is invoked as the basis for securing equitable relief it should be one which could be proven to possess
some value. A failure to establish this fact, together with an
evident reluctance on the part of courts of equity to specifically
enforce contracts against competition, accounts for the holding of
the Appellate Court for the First District in the case of Behn v.
Shapiro.78 The court there reversed a permanent injunction against
a former partner, who had sold his interest in the firm and its
good will to the surviving partner, restraining against the solicitation of the firm's customers when it was made to appear that
there was no express covenant against competition; no treatment
of the good will as an asset on the books of the partnership; and
no showing as to whether the customers approached by the defendant had been constant or only occasional customers of the firm.
Being unable to find that the alleged good will was a substantial
business asset, the court said there was no reason for an injunction to protect the alleged property right.
In another case, that of Shatz v. Paul79 the jurisdictional
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 91, § 1 et seq.
77 See the case of Smith v. Illinois Adjustment Finance Co., 326 Ill. App. 654,
63 N. E. (2d) 264 (1945), for an instance of the use of an injunction to restrain
against unlicensed law practice.
Leave to appeal has been
788 Ill. App. (2d) 25, 130 N. E. (2d) 295 (1955).
denied.
79 7 I1. App. (2d) 223, 129 N. E. (2d) 348 (1955).
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issue arose over the point whether a court of equity could protect a person against an abusive use of legal process in the form
The complaint charged that the
of a capias ad respondendumn.8
defendants had discounted a number of invoices for two corporations in which the plaintiff was an officer but had contended, following upon corporate bankruptcy, that plaintiff had induced the
defendants to make the discount by means of fraudulent representations; that defendants had instituted a series of separate
suits on these purported frauds and had caused a series of separate capiases to be issued upon which plaintiff had been arrested;
that this program had been undertaken to harass plaintiff, for the
defendants well knew plaintiff was without property and lacked
sufficient funds to pay bail bond premiums to secure relief from
the writs already issued; and that still other suits and writs were
in the offing. A temporary injunction issued in plaintiff's behalf
was affirmed by the Appellate Court for the First District in an
opinion which, while recognizing that writs of this nature were
legal, albeit open to criticism, nevertheless held them to be subject
to equitable restraint where, as in the case at hand, they were
used in an abusive fashion and an adequate remedy at law was
lacking.
While adequate protection against an ejectment suit may now
exist in that equitable claims and defenses may be interposed
therein,"' that fact alone should not prevent recourse to a separate equitable proceeding if the defendant in the ejectment suit
prefers to seek equitable relief, particularly if it is to be of an
affirmative character such as the quieting of a title. For this reason, therefore, the Supreme Court, in the case of Ginther v.
Duginger,2 held that even though the defendant could have interposed a separate equitable counterclaim in the ejectment action 3
he was free, if he so wished, to institute a separate equitable proceeding to accomplish his purpose. But, according to the holding
80 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 16,

§1.

81 See ante, this section, note 68, for reference to the case of Miller v. Siwicki,

8 Ii. (2d) 362, 134 N. E. (2d) 321 (1956).
826 Ill. (2d) 474, 129 N. E. (2d) 147 (1955).
83 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 110, § 38.

SURVEY OF ILLINOIS LAW-1955-1956

in Ptaszek v. Konczal, 4 this principle would not hold true where
the statutory remedy is of exclusive character for then resort to
equity would result in a circumvention of the statute. It was there
held proper to refuse an injunction to restrain the offering of a
will to probate on the ground the sole remedy lay in a contest of
the will in the event of and after its admission to probate.8 5
Reformation of instruments drafted incorrectly because of
mistake falls clearly within the jurisdiction of an equity court so
the case of Hyman-Michaels Company v. Massachusetts Bonding
& Insurance Company" is significant only because it presents an
interesting factual situation involved in a futile attempt to have
an insurance policy reformed on the basis of an alleged mutual
mistake. The corporation there concerned had insured its officers
against death occurring in aviation accidents on regularly scheduled passenger airlines. A new policy with a different company
was negotiated through the efforts of an independent broker but
it was limited so as to cover only certain designated airlines, which
list did not include one carrier on whose airplane a corporate
officer came to his death. A suit to reform the new policy was
held properly dismissed when the proof showed that the broker
was not an agent of the insurer issuing the new policy and that
the company was not made aware of the insured's desire to obtain
the same broad coverage it had formerly enjoyed.
Not specifically of equitable cognizance but considered here
because the statutory proceeding carries with it some equitable
overtones8 7 are two points made in relation to partition cases. In
8 the successful plaintiff
Blancett v. Taylor,"
orally made a demand
on the master, immediately before the sale, to cause the premises
to be sold free and clear of an existing mortgage, which demand
was observed by the making of a suitable oral announcement to
847

Ill. (2d) 145, 130 N. E. (2d) 257 (1955).

85 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 242.

869 Ill. App. (2d) 13, 132 N. E. (2d) 347 (1956). Leave to appeal has been
denied.
87 I1. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 106, § 1 et seq. Section 44 thereof, for example,
directs that the proceeding shall be predicated on a "complaint in chancery."
88 6 Iii. (2d) 434, 128 N. E. (2d) 916 (1955).
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that effect before bids were received. It was there held that the
plaintiff could not thereafter object to the sale so made on the
ground the sale did not comply with the decree, which contained
no provision for a sale clear of encumbrance, because the plaintiff
was said to be estopped by his own conduct. The case of Allendorf
v. Daily 9 would indicate that, in the event a partition of the
premises is made rather than a sale thereof, it would be competent
for the partition commissioners to create an easement when needed,
by way of charging one portion of the land with a right of way in
favor of another part thereof, if this was essential to achieve a
fair and impartial division.
Practice in relation to the issuance of writs of injunction was
involved in the case of American Dixie Shops, Inc. v. Springfield
Lords, Inc.,9 a case in which the plaintiff endeavored to assert a
cross-appeal from part of an order which had dissolved a temporary injunction as to certain defendants at a time when other
defendants, whose motion to vacate had been denied, took their
appeal from the injunctive order so sustained. The Appellate
Court for the Third District, on the basis of the statute then in
force and effect, 91 agreed that the cross-appeal was subject to a
motion to dismiss since interlocutory appeal, at that time, was
permitted only in the event the questioned order had either (1)
granted an injunction, (2) had overruled a motion to dissolve the
same, or (3) had enlarged the scope of an existing injunction. It
should be noted, however, that since the holding in that case, the
statute relating to appeal from temporary restraining orders has
been amended so that it now permits of an appeal, or a crossappeal, where the interlocutory order serves to modify the injunction as well as in the cases previously considered.92

89 6 Il1.

(2d) 577, 129 N. E. (2d) 673 (1955).
90 8 I1. App. (2d) 129, 130 N. E. (2d) 532 (1955).
91 11. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 202.
92 See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 78.
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PREPARATION OF PLEADINGS

Aside from the case of Nudd v. Matsoukas," which dealt with
the sufficiency of a complaint in a wrongful death case to state a
cause of action on behalf of a dependent minor child against one
parent for having caused the death of the other parent, 94 the principal holding in the past year relating to the preparation of a
complaint in a civil suit is to be found in the case of Parrinov.
Landon." The action there concerned was a simple case for personal injury directed against the driver of an automobile and also
at the owner thereof, the former being charged with active misconduct in operating the car with the knowledge and consent of
the latter but the complaint was silent on the point as to whether
or not the driver was the authorized agent and servant of the car
owner. The driver was not served with process. The owner,
although served, offered no contest until he appealed from a default judgment, urging there was neither pleading nor proof to
support a judgment against him. The Appellate Court for the
Second District treated the complaint as being sufficient on the
theory that the presumption of agency which arises from the fact
of ownership plus the giving of permission to another to use the
car 96 was enough to inform the defendant of the nature of the case
asserted so as to require an answer of the part of the supposed
principal to deny the purported agency relationship, particularly
so after judgment had been pronounced. 7 The Supreme Court
affirmed the holding, after noting that the whole dispute could
have been avoided by the insertion of a brief additional phrase in
the complaint,98 under an opinion which reflects a deep concern
in stripping litigation from the morass of technicality that is apt
937 Il. (2d) 608, 131 N. E. (2d) 525 (1956), noted in 34 GIoAGo-KENT LAW
REvixw 333.
94 The substantive character of a case of this nature is discussed elsewhere in
this Survey. See Division V, Family Law, note 1, and Division VIII, Torts, note 1.
95 8 Ill. (2d) 468, 134 N. E. (2d) 311 (1956), in which Bristow, J., dissented,
affirming 6 Ill. App. (2d) 375, 128 N. E. (2d) 356 (1955), where Dove, J., wrote a
dissenting opinion.
96 Howard v. Amerson, 236 Ill. App. 587 (1925).
97 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 42(3).
98 See, in particular, 8 Ill. (2d) 468 at 470, 134 N. E. (2d) 311 at 312.
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to surround it unless defendants see fit to make prompt and proper
objection to the sufficiency of complaints at the first opportunity.
While the Civil Practice Act contemplates that the pleader,
when drafting the complaint, should set forth "specific prayers
for the relief to which the pleader deems himself entitled, ' 99
there is every reason to believe that such prayers should not
limit the power of a court to grant appropriate relief under the
case made, particularly where the defendant is present in court.'
Whether the practice of including a general prayer is appropriate
or not, 2 the Supreme Court holding in the case of Pope v. Speiser'
now makes it evident that not even a general prayer is necessary,
provided the trial court, by proper order and on just terms, protects the adverse party from prejudice by reason of surprise in
granting whatever relief would be appropriate on the case before
it. The court there affirmed a decree granting relief by way of
an equitable lien for improvements made on the land even though
the plaintiff had been unsuccessful in his endeavor to secure the
requested specific relief by way of specific performance of an oral
agreement to convey an interest in the land.
Alternative allegations in a complaint are rarely used, generally because the pleader has been able to verify in advance the
facts on which he wishes to rely or because he elects to state the
several possible causes in separate counts, as if he possessed so
many different and distinct claims. There is authority, however,
for the use of alternative allegation, whether as to the facts of
the case 4 or as to the parties, 5 even within the framework of a
single count, so the holding in the case of Wedell v. American
Telephone & Telegraph Company should invoke no surprise. The
99 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. Z Ch. 110, § 34.
'Ibid., Ch. 110, § 33(3) and § 42(2).
2 Ibid., Ch. 110, § 34, might be construed to contain a denial of the right to make
use of a general prayer. But see Anson v. Haywood, 397 Ill. 370, 74 N. E. (2d)
489 (1947), and David v. Ridgely-Farmers Safe Deposit Co., 342 Ill. App. 96, 95
N. E. (2d) 725 (1950).
37 111. (2d) 255, 130 N. E. (2d) 507 (1955).
4111. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 43(2).
5 Ibid., Ch. 110, §§ 23-4.
68 Il. App. (2d) 510, 132 N. E. (2d) 371 (1956).
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particular count there concerned sought relief against an instrument on the ground it had been obtained by fraud, but the pleader
had been careful enough to realize the possibility that he might
not be able to substantiate this claim so he had alleged, in the
alternative, that the signature had been affixed to the instrument
under a mistake. The count was, in fact, open to objection under
the fraud theory but the Appellate Court for the Third District
declared it to be sufficient in its alternative aspect, so it reversed
a judgment which had stricken the count for failure to state a
7
cause of action.
The possibility of using a complaint as a device for setting
forth a multiplicity of claims is conditioned by the fact that such
claims, if asserted by multiple but non-joint plaintiffs, must arise
from a common transaction, or series of transactions, and must
involve common questions of law or fact, without which separate
suits would have to be employed.' Mention has already been made,
in relation to joinder of parties,9 of two cases decided during the
year which have bearing on this point. The opinion in one of these
cases, that by the Appellate Court for the First District in the
case of Opal v. Material Service Corporation,10 is worthy of special mention for the elaborate discussion it contains not only as
to the meaning to be ascribed to the phrase "transaction or series
of transactions" to be found in the statute authorizing the joinder
but also for its careful recognition of the procedural problems
which will confront a trial court at the time of hearing the joined
claims. The case suggests the proposition that a compound trial,
or even a simple trial, might well be divided into two parts; one
to deal with the issues concerning liability, and the other, if
needed, to be confined to questions concerning the kind or amount
of damage. Such a division could well be productive of a substantial saving in judicial time for the second part of the trial
might well prove to be unnecessary in many instances. The
7 It should be noted that, in Illinois, the presence of a bad alternative does not
affect a good one: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 43(2).
8 Ibid., Ch. 110, §§ 23-4.
9 See ante, this division, note 50.
109 Ill. App. (2d) 433, 133 N. E. (2d) 733 (1956).
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thought is one which would bear investigation, especially in an
area where court calendars are clogged with a heavy back-log
of cases.
From the standpoint of the preparation of defensive pleadings, some additional light has been shed by some of the recent
cases on the form of answer which should be used to generate a
variety of issues of utility to the defendant. A denial type of
answer would, of course, add nothing new to a case beyond that
which had already been alleged. For this reason, it was urged,
in the case of Moore v. Daydif, 1 that it would be error to permit
a defendant to offer proof that the plaintiff in a personal injury
case was intoxicated at the time, since this fact ought to be pleaded
as an affirmative defense. The court there concerned held otherwise, treating the evidence as being relevant under the issue created by defendant's denial of the essential allegation that plaintiff was exercising due care and caution at the time for his own
safety. 2 By contrast, in the case of Penrod v. Smith," the court
held that evidence intended to show a purported illegality in a
partnership arrangement in a margin account was properly excluded because the defendant had not generated an issue with
respect thereto by reason of the failure to use an affirmative
answer. 14 The case of Galvan v. Torres,5 following common law
pleading concepts,' points out that if the defendant in a battery
case wishes to rely on a claim of self-defense, this too must be
affirmatively pleaded.
Admissions contained in defensive pleadings may frequently
save the plaintiff from the responsibility of proving what might
117 Ill. App. (2d) 534, 130 N. E. (2d) 119 (1955).
12 The Appellate Court for the Second District there distinguished the case before it from its earlier holding in Blake v. Ewers, 341 Ill. App. 382, 91 N. E.
(2d) 75 (1950), abst. opin., on the ground the earlier case was an "unusual one"
in this respect.
139 Ill. App. (2d) 257, 132 N. E. (2d) 675 (1956).
Leave to appeal has been
denied.
14111. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, §43(4), makes specific reference to
"illegality" as being an affirmative defense.
15 8 Ill. App. (2d) 227, 131 N. U. (2d) 367 (1956).
16 The "not guilty" plea in trespass for assault and battery had merely generated
an issue as to whether or not, in fact, the defendant had assaulted or battered
the plaintiff: Olsen v. Upsahl, 69 Ill. 273 (1873).
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otherwise be a difficult matter to establish." The case of Robinson v. Workman,18 however, would reveal that such an admission
should be treated as rising no higher than its source. The plaintiff
there had charged that his decedent was riding in a motor vehicle
"as a guest" of the defendant, which allegation had been specifically admitted by the answer. There being no competent eyewitness to establish the circumstances, plaintiff sought to have
the court infer, from this admission, that the defendant, of necessity, must have been the driver of the automobile at the time of
the accident so as to relieve the plaintiff of the responsibility of
proving that fact. The Appellate Court for the Third District
refused to so conclude, being of the opinion that the admission
of a guest relationship did not preclude the possible inference that
it was the guest who was doing the driving at the time.
The defendant's answer may also be used as a vehicle by
which to assert countering demands by defendant against the
plaintiff or others, which demands would not, ordinarily, have to
bear any degree of relationship to those claims asserted by the
plaintiff in the complaint.'
In the event a counterclaim is included in an answer to a complaint resting upon a statutory cause
of action, however, the enabling statute may qualify the right to
use a counterclaim so as to prevent encumbering the record with
matters not germane to the original proceeding. It was, therefore, argued in the case of Allensworth v. First Galesburg National
Bank & Trust Company" that it would be improper for a defendant in a forcible entry and detainer suit to offer an equitable counterclaim seeking to quiet title to the premises concerned as the
controlling statute did contain a restriction of the type men17 The admission may also come about from a failure to deny: Ill. Rev. Stat.
1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 40(2).
18 7 Ill. App. (2d) 42, 129 N. E. (2d) 32 (1955). The Supreme Court, not in the
period of this survey, later reversed the holding therein under an opinion which
makes no reference to the pleading question but which deals entirely with the
sufficiency of the proof when considered in relation to a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict: 9 Ill. (2d) 420, 137 N. E. (2d) 804 (1956).
19 In general, see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 38. Third-party practice,
which might also involve the use of a counterclaim, is regulated by ibid., Ch. 110,
§ 25 (2).
20 7 Ill. App. (2d) 1, 128 N. E. (2d) 600 (1955), noted in 34 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REvIEw 263. Leave to appeal has been denied.
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tioned. 21 The Appellate Court for the Second District came to the
conclusion that the counterclaim so offered was within the scope of
the restriction and, as a consequence, it affirmed a decree based
thereon.
In the event the defensive answer contains new matter, either
by way of an affirmative defense or by counterclaim, it becomes
incumbent on the plaintiff to prepare and file a reply22 or become
subject to the penalty of an admission with respect to such new
matter from the failure to respond thereto.23 If the reply itself
is to be drafted in an affirmative form, the plaintiff should be
careful to avoid the pleading fault heretofore described as a departure,24 for it should be the function of such a reply to reinforce the complaint and to show why the original claim was still
enforcible anything in the answer to the contrary notwithstand25
ing. The case of Norman v. School District No. 1, Pope County
serves as a good illustration of this point for it was there held
proper, in a contractor's suit against a school board for the
balance due on a building contract to which the board had made
answer on the ground that the balance had not become payable
because the building had not yet been accepted in the manner
contemplated by the contract, for the plaintiff to predicate his
reply to the affirmative defense on a school board resolution which
had admitted the validity of the plaintiff's claim and had provided for the making of necessary financial arrangements to per26
mit the payment thereof.
21

Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 57, § 5.

22
23

Ibid., Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 32.
Ibid., Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 40(2).

24

Shipman, Handbook of Common Law Pleading (West Publishing Co., St. Paul,

1923), 3d Ed., pp. 376-81.
25 8 111. App. (2d) 466, 131 N. E. (2d) 811 (1956).
26 In the course of the opinion therein, the Appellate Court for the Fourth
District indicated that the plaintiff had an option (1) to prepare a complaint In
which he might have anticipated the defense and offered facts at the outset to
overcome the same, or (2) to wait until the defense was raised by answer and
then use a reply for the same purpose: 8 Ill. App. (2d) 466 at 471, 131 N. E. (2d)
811 at 814. The first of these methods would have been entirely appropriate in an
equity proceeding, but it is doubted that a plaintiff in a law suit should ever
anticipate a defense: Western Union Tel. Co. v. Henley, 157 Ind. 90, 60 N. E. 682
(1901). But see Clark, Handbook of the Law Code Pleading (West Publishing Co.,
St. Paul, 1947), 2d Ed., pp. 250-2.
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The new matter so asserted should, of course, be sufficient
in law to avoid the affirmative defense; otherwise, the defendant
would be entitled to move for a judgment on the pleadings in
defendant's favor. 7 It became necessary, therefore, in the case
of Bowman v. Illinois Central Railroad Company,25 for the court
to determine whether a reply based on an injured person's lack
of capacity to execute a release, which had been pleaded as a
defense to a federal employer's liability case, was sufficient to
overcome the defense in the absence of an allegation of the restoration, or at least a statement that a tender had been made, of
the consideration paid for the release. The court resolved the
problem in favor of upholding the reply by reliance upon the
29
federal rather than the state rule on the subject.
THE TRIAL OF THE CASE

Trial of the case may well become unnecessary in the event
the defendant has entered into a valid cognovit by which he has
agreed that judgment may be entered against him by confession.
The important thing to notice, in this respect, is that the cognovit
must be a valid one for, without this, the court entering the judgment would lack jurisdiction. The case of Goldberg v. Schroeder,"
by way of supplementation of an earlier holding,3 ' not only serves
to illustrate the factors which could be called upon to show that
a cognovit was invalid but also declares inoperative a portion
of a local court rule which would limit a defendant, seeking to
vacate a judgment taken by confession, to those instances where
the jurisdictional defect appeared on the face of the court record. 2
27 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 57.
289 Ill. App. (2d) 182, 132 N. E. (2d) 558 (1956). Leave to appeal has been
granted.
29 Dice v. Akron, C. & Y. R. Co., 342 U. S. 359, 72 S. Ct. 312, 96 L. Ed. 398
(1952), noted in 30 CMCAGo-KENT LAW REvrEw 364.
30 10 Ini. App. (2d) 186, 134 N. E. (2d) 615 (1956). Burke, J., wrote a dissenting
opinion.
3' See Green v. Walsh, 5 Ill. App. (2d) 535, 126 N. E. (2d) 398 (1955), dealing
with the right of a plaintiff to take judgment by confession in a county other than
one which would meet the venue requirements of Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2,
Ch. 110, § 5.

32 Rules of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Rule 47, § 3.
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The defendant there, under an appropriate special appearance,3 3
was held to be entitled to show that the note relied upon was
invalid, both for want of delivery and because of the absence
of the signature of certain other essential parties, without being
placed under any obligation to plead that he had any other
34
meritorious defense to the plaintiff's claim.
Preparation for trial would appear to have been enhanced
greatly by the Supreme Court holding in the case of Krupp v.
Chicago Transit Authority.3 5 In that case, a suit to recover for
personal injury, the plaintiff sought by discovery to obtain from
defendant the names and addresses of all witnesses to the events
involved in the lawsuit. Acting under the authority of Section
58 of the former Civil Practice Act, 36 plaintiff submitted certain
interrogatories, two of which were designed to obtain from defendant the names and addresses of any persons known to defendant who had witnessed the accident or the subsequent physical
condition of the plaintiff. Defendant refused to give this information on the ground that it was not obliged to disclose the
names of those who might be its witnesses at the trial. The trial
court, because of this refusal, found defendant guilty of contempt.
The Appellate Court for the First District reversed this ruling
on the ground that Section 58, while it had provided for new
methods of discovery, had not extended the substantive scope
of discovery beyond that formerly available. The Supreme Court,
on leave to appeal, in turn reversed the Appellate Court when
it held that Section 58 did authorize discovery under written
interrogatory with respect to the names and addresses of persons
known by the opposing party to possess knowledge of the relevant
facts. The decision has been criticized, first as being in apparent
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 20.
The court indicated that Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 101.23, dealing
with the manner by which judgments taken by confession may be opened, was
inapplicable to cases in which the defendant sought relief on the ground that the
trial court lacked jurisdiction.
358 Ill. (2d) 37, 132 N. E. (2d) 532 (1956), noted in 34 CHIcAGO-KENT LAW
Rrvimw 341 and 44 Ill. B. J. 784, reversing 4 Ill. App. (2d) 222, 124 N. E. (2d) 13
(1955).
36 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 182. The present provision has been
subjected to substantial revision: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 58.
33
34
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conflict with another section of the Civil Practice Act which now
purports to declare that a party shall not be required to furnish
the names and addresses of his witnesses,17 and second because
the distinction which has been drawn between "occurrence witnesses'' and "trial witnesses" appears to be a tenuous one.38
Aside from the problem of statutory construction, however, it
may be said that the court has reached a desirable result, one
well in accord with the modern liberal trend toward reducing the
surprise element in the trial of a lawsuit.
In the realm of evidence law, at least as the same relates
to proof in civil cases, 39 reference might be made to the case of
Lotta v. Lotta4 0 for the application made therein of the so-called
"dead man's" restriction concerning the competency of witnesses.
to a new type of situation. The case was one in which the plaintiffs sued to establish a trust as to certain real property which
had been purchased with their funds and the title to which had
been taken in the name of their mother. The mother conveyed
to an intermediary who, in turn, conveyed to the plaintiffs'
father and the father had thereafter devised the property to his
wife and all of the children. These facts did not become known
to plaintiffs until after the father had died. The foregoing facts
were established at the trial by the testimony of the plaintiffs
admitted over objection based on Section 2 of the Evidence Act,
which provides that no party to a civil action shall be permitted
to testify therein, on his own motion or in his own behalf, when
any adverse party sues or defends as heir or devisee of a
deceased person.4 1 The trial court apparently felt that the statute
was not applicable, possibly because the facts testified to did not
involve the personal knowledge of the decedent in any way and
the transaction so established concerned only the plaintiffs and
their mother, a living person. The Supreme Court, on direct
37 See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch.
38 See comment in 44 Ii. B. J. 784.

110, § 58(3).

39 Some matters of evidence peculiar to criminal cases are discussed below,
Division- IV, Criminal Law and Procedure.
406 Ill. (2d) 393, 129 N. E. (2d) 153 (1955).
41 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 51, § 2. The statute contains certain exceptions
which are not here relevant.
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appeal, brushed this point aside; held that the case fell squarely
within the prohibition of statute ;42 and reversed the judgment
for error in the admission of the proof. When it is remembered,
however, that the rationale underlying the statute is one to
protect the estates of deceased persons against fraudulent claims
by putting the parties representing a decedent on an equal footing with their opponents, 43 it would seem that the statute should
have been held inapplicable, particularly because of the deceased
person's total absence of connection with the transaction and the
other facts to which the plaintiffs had testified.
In another case falling under the same statute, that of
Belfield v. Coop,4 the question concerned dealt with the admissibility of a wire recording of conversations of the testator with
one Sara Grate, a beneficiary under the will. These conversations
had taken place at the time of and immediately prior to the
execution of the will and had a bearing on the issue of lack of
testamentary capacity and of execution of the will while under
undue influence. Sara Grate was herself clearly incompetent to
be a witness but, at the suggestion of the attorney who had drawn
the will, she had taken the attorney's tape recorder to the hospital
where the decedent was a patient and had there made a recording
which consisted of her reading of the will to the testator, his
statements at the end of each paragraph, and his response to
specific questions concerning whether he knew who he was, what
property he owned, and whether he wished to sign the will. This
evidence was offered on behalf of the proponents of the will,
including the said Sara Grate. No objection was made as to the
form of the offer of proof, but the trial court rejected the
evidence on the ground that, since Sara Grate would not herself
be a competent witness, her reading of the will and the questions
and answers recorded were likewise incompetent.
42 This would be true in the event the statute should be given a literal interpretation.
43 Frederlch v. Wolf, 383 Ill. 638, 50 N. E. (2d)
755 (1943); Vancuren v.
Vancuren, 348 Ill. App. 351, 109 N. E. (2d) 255 (1952). See also Wigmore, Evidence,
§§ 578, 1576 and 2065, wherein is a discussion of the basis for the rule and also a
criticism of it.
44 8 Ill. (2d) 293, 134 N. E. (2d) 249 (1956).
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The Supreme Court rejected this contention, stating that the
matter was governed by the principle laid down in the earlier
case of Garrus v. Davis,45 wherein it had been held that a witness
could testify to the contents of a conversation had between the
plaintiff-contestant and the testatrix even though the plaintiff
herself would be incompetent to testify with respect thereto.
The court reasoned that since a competent third person overhearing the conversation of Sara Grate and the decedent might
have related the nature of the occurrence, the fact that there
was a wire recording instead of a human witness would not call
for a different result. In a sense, however, the case does go a
step beyond the earlier holding in that here the mechanical device
was under the control of the incompetent witness, whereas the
competent witness in the Garrus case presumably was not.
Another interesting point was also raised therein, one having
to do with the construction of Section 60 of the Civil Practice
Act" as it has bearing on Section 2 of the Evidence Act.4 7 At
the hearing in the county court upon the petition to admit the
will to probate, the contestants had called Sara Grate and she
had been fully examined, over the objections of proponents, under
the pertinent section of the Civil Practice Act, for the purpose
of showing fraud, forgery, or other improper conduct in connection with the execution of the will. At the later trial in the
circuit court, the defendants offered the transcript of this witness's testimony in the county court but it was excluded on the
ground that the witness was not a competent one. Counsel for
the defense, assigning error, relied on Section 92 of the Probate
Act, 48 which directs that an "authentic transcript of the testimony of any witness taken at the time of the hearing on the
admission of the will to probate is admissible in evidence." The
Supreme Court agreed, saying that to hold otherwise would be
to read an unauthorized exception into the pertinent section of
the Probate Act.
45 234 Ii. 326, 84 N. E. 942 (1908).
46 I11. Rev. Stat. 1965, Vol. 2, Ch. 110,
47 Ibid., Vol. 1, Ch. 51, § 2.
48 Ibid., Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 244.
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The extent to which demonstrative evidence may be used
came before the Appellate Court for the Fourth District in two
cases, one entitled Smith v. Ohio Oil Company49 and the other
5 ° The Smith case involved the use
entitled Winters v. Richerson.
of a human skeleton in connection with an explanation of the
plaintiff's injuries given by the plaintiff's medical expert, to
which the defendant had assigned error on the grounds that such
use was unnecessary to an understanding of the issues, was
gruesome, and tended to arouse the emotions of the jurors. The
court, while recognizing the prejudice which might result from
an improper use of such evidence, pointed out that it could be
of great value in aiding human understanding and its use was
proper when the evidence was relevant and actually explanatory.
The court noted that the physician had not used the model in
connection with his description of the injuries, of the operation
performed, or the method of treatment but only to supplement
the description of the present and continuing injury, which involved the pelvic area and one most difficult for the average
person to visualize. In particular, the expert had pointed out
the displacement of the bones from the normal and the point of
excess strain, as well as how this would affect the plaintiff's
balance. It concluded, therefore, that no error had occurred even
though it refused to announce any flat rule, saying that the
question was one of relevance.
In the Winters case, however, the same court reversed a
judgment for an improper use made of evidence of the same type
when it was deemed to be unnecessary to a clear explanation and
exemplification of the medical expert's testimony. In this instance,
the plaintiff had produced instruments used in an operation and
had-caused the medical witness to carry on a demonstration of
operative technique in addition to the production of a skeleton
and testimony with reference to it. The court, condemning the
demonstration of the operative technique as not -conducive to a
fair and impartial consideration of the issues presented, made it
49 10 111. App. (2d) 67, 134 N. E. (2d) 526 (1956).
509 I11. App. (2d) 359, 132 N. E. (2d) 673 (1956).
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clear that it was applying the same principle to reach the
opposite result.
Admissions of one kind or another may constitute acceptable
forms of proof. In the case of People v. Mikka,5 ' for example,
the Supreme Court held that, while it would be generally improper
to permit the state to show that a defendant had refused to
make a statement following his arrest, principally because the
accused has a right to remain silent and his refusal would have
no tendency to prove or to disprove the charge against him, if
the defendant does later make a statement after first refusing
to do so and also takes the stand in his own behalf, it would
be proper to admit the testimony of a police officer to the effect
that the arrested person had first refused to make a statement.
In the eminent domain proceeding entitled City of Waukegan v.
Stanczak,52 by contrast, the court excluded evidence of an offer
made by the condemnor to purchase the property, sought to be
shown as an admission against interest. On appeal, this ruling
was affirmed, the Supreme Court holding that as an offer by the
condemning authority is a requisite to a showing that the price
could not be agreed on and such an offer is often made in the
form of a premium for a quick acquisition of the land in the
public interest, to permit proof of this offer would penalize the
condemnor for taking necessary and desirable steps.
The question of the right of a defendant to show the narcotic
addiction of a party, as having a bearing on the issue of selfdefense, was raised in the case of People v. Moretti5 3 The defendant there claimed that he had been defending himself from
one Salvi, who was claimed to have fired the fatal shot in a
brawl in which the victim was slain. The trial court excluded the
proffered evidence that Salvi was a narcotic addict. The Supreme
Court considered it to be the argument of the defendant that
"evidence of drug addiction, past or present, is, without more,
51 7 Ill.(2d)
848, 100 L. Ed.
52 6 Inl. (2d)
53 6 Ini. (2d)

443, 131 N. E. (2d) 91 (1955), cert. den. 351 U. S. 951, 76 S. Ot.
(adv.) 692 (1956).
577, 129 N. E. (2d) 678 (1955).
494, 129 N. E. (2d) 709 (1955).
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admissible in a homicide action for the purpose of determining
the aggressor. ' ' 5 Recognizing this issue to be an open question
in Illinois, and drawing on precedents from other states, the
court held that no error had occurred in excluding the evidence
as it was deemed to be both irrelevant and incompetent when unaccompanied by proof (1) that Salvi was still an addict at the
time of the homicide; (2) that he was dangerous and violent as
a consequence of his addiction; (3) that he was dangerous and
violent when under the influence of narcotic drugs; and (4) that
he was under their influence at the time the homicide occurred.
The failure to lay an adequate foundation, of necessity, required
exclusion of the evidence but proof of this nature may yet become
admissible in a proper case.
Insofar as trial tactics were concerned, mention might be
made of a few points established during the year. In People v.
Kelly, 5 the Supreme Court held that it would not necessarily be
reversible error for a petit juror to serve on a traverse jury
when her husband had previously served on the grand jury which
had returned the indictment against the defendant. The court
was careful, however, not to use language which would bind it
in future cases, if prejudice should be made apparent from the
circumstances, for it pointed out that the case was not one involving fraud or deception; that the husband was out of town at the
time of the trial; that the parties had not discussed the case
at either time; and that there was not, as a matter of law, any
basis for an inference of prejudice from the mere fact of jury
service under the circumstances. In People v. Moore,56 the defendant was being tried for burglary and the trial court overlooked giving an instruction of vital importance to the state.
The jury had initially retired but had not selected a foreman
nor commenced its deliberations. The trial court recalled the
jury and gave the omitted instruction. The Supreme Court said
that this "perhaps gave undue emphasis" to the importance of
54 6 IH. (2d) 494 at 521, 129 N. E. (2d) 709 at 724.
558 Ill. (2d) 604, 136 N. E. (2d) 785 (1956).
56 6 Ill. (2d) 449, 129 N. E. (2d) 5 (1955).
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the instruction but held that the corrective procedure so adopted
was not a sufficient ground for reversal. The case of Keller v.
Menconi5 7 also suggests that, in the event a motion for new trial
is inadequate for failure to specify the ground therefor, 5 counsel
may not remedy the defect simply by preparing and filing an
amended motion with the clerk of the court but must obtain leave
for this purpose and then only after notice to the opposite party.
DAMAGES

The extent to which a trial judge may act to alter a jury
verdict insofar as the same fixes the amount of damages to be
awarded a successful plaintiff appears to have caused the reviewing courts the greatest difficulty during the past year. Following
a jury verdict in the case of Yep Hong v. Williams,59 the plaintiff
moved for a new trial on the ground that the verdict was inadequate. The trial judge then ordered the defendant to consent
to an additur in an appropriate amount as a condition to the
overruling of said motion. 0 On review, the Appellate Court for
the First District held that a trial judge would be without power
to enlarge upon a jury verdict in a tort action where the damages
were unliquidated in character. It should be pointed out, however, that the instant decision is to be distinguished from cases
involving liquidated damages where additurs have been allowed."'
By contrast, a problem relating to a reduction in a jury
verdict arose in the case of Schumacher v. Rosenthal.22 Although
it is now well-settled law that, in a suit against one joint tortfeasor, the amount paid by another tort-feasor for a covenant
not to sue should be considered insofar as it may have bearing
on the amount of damages to be awarded, the manner in which
57 7 I1.

App. (2d) 250, 129 N. E. (2d) 341 (1955).

Leave to appeal has been

denied.
58 II. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 192.
596 I1. App. (2d) 456, 128 N. E. (2d) 655 (1956), noted in 34 CHIOMAO-KENT
LAw RLvrNw 186.
60 The defendant failed to enter the required consent and the appeal was taken
by him from an adverse ruling on the motion for a new trial.
61 See James v. Morey, 44 I1. 352 (1867), and Carr v. Miner, 42 Ill. 179 (1866).
62226 F. (2d) 946 (1955).
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that factor is to be introduced into the case does not enjoy like
clarity.6 3 When the United States Court of Appeal for the Seventh
Circuit, in the aforementioned case, faced this problem it approved
the action of a trial judge in reducing the judgment based on a
jury verdict by the amount paid for the covenant.
A different method of dealing with this problem, and in relation to the proper procedure to be followed in correcting a jury's
verdict, is indicated in the case of Paul Harris Furniture Company v. Morse.64 The suit was one for property damage resulting
from an explosion and fire caused by escaping gas. The jury had
returned a verdict which was grossly inadequate in view of the
fact that the parties had entered into stipulations which virtually
fixed the amount of damages in a liquidated sum. Nevertheless,
the jury, apparently after being informed as to amounts paid
by one of the tort-feasors for a covenant not to sue, while finding
another defendant guilty on the question of liability or not, fixed
the measure of damage at an amount which paralleled exactly
that paid for the covenant. The plaintiffs thereupon moved for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, for
a new trial to be limited solely to the question of damages. The
Appellate Court for the Third District applied the rule that,
in the event the size of the verdict indicated that it was the result
of a compromise, the entire verdict should be considered as tainted
and a new trial ordered but ended with the conclusion that since
the plaintiffs had not moved for a new trial generally, the verdict
65
had to be sustained.

63 In the case of DeLude v. Rimek. 351 Ill. App. 466, 115 N. E. (2d) 561 (1953),
the Appellate Court for the First District held that the amount paid for the covenant should be deducted from the verdict of the jury. But in Aldridge v. Morris,
337 Ill. App. 369, 86 N. E. (2d) 143 (1949), the Appellate Court for the Second
District held that the fact of the covenant should be submitted to the jury to
consider along with all other elements of damage. The problem becomes acute in
actions where liability is limited because, In either event, the jury will be instructed to bring back a verdict not in excess of the statutory limit.
64 7 Ill. App. (2d) 452, 130 N. E. (2d) 16 (1955).
65 The Supreme Court, on leave to appeal and subsequent to the period of this
survey, held that it would be appropriate to hold a new trial to be limited solely
to the question concerning the proper amount of damages to be assessed: 10 Ill.
(2d) 28, 139 N. E. (2d) 275 (1957).
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APPEAL AND APPELLATE PROCEDURE

With one exception, the few cases which dealt with novel
problems in relation to the conduct of appeals were of trivial
consequence. Thus, in certain instances, it is a condition precedent
to the proper conduct of an appeal that the costs of the clerk
of the trial court be paid either at the time the appeal is taken
or within a competent time thereafter,6 6 otherwise the appeal
would be subject to a motion to dismiss the same. While there
has been some disposition to accept a good-faith endeavor to meet
this requirement as being sufficient for the purpose, 8 the case of
In re Wolz's Estate6 9 would indicate that a late payment, without
more, would be insufficient to sustain an appeal. Observance of
the appropriate time schedule for the taking of essential steps
in relation to the appeal is also a matter of concern, unless an
enlargement thereof is obtained 70 but, according to the case of
Sparacino v. Ferona,71 the mere filing of a motion for an extension
of time in the office of the clerk of the court is not enough for
this purpose, as a court order on the point would be essential.
In addition, the case of Gray v. Gray72 would indicate that there
is no provision in the rules governing the conduct of appeals to
permit the filing of an additional or supplemental abstract of
anything in the record in support of a petition for rehearing so
that, if one is filed, it will be stricken.
The sole case of consequence in this area of the law is the
3 which deals with the extent of
one entitled Lind v. Spannuth,7
66 See, for example, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1. Ch. 3. §484.
67 Davison v. Heinrich, 340 Ill. 349, 172 N. E. 770 (1930).
68 In the case of McClelland v. Estate of Gorrell, 327 Ill. App. 224, 63 N. E. (2d)
884 (1945). the appellant's attorney left several duly signed blank checks with the
clerk and gave authorization to complete the same by the filling in of the appropriate figures when the several amounts of the cost items had been ascertained.
It was there held proper to deny a motion to dismiss the appeal which had been
predicated on the ground of non-compliance with the statute.
69 7 Il1.

App. (2d) 517, 130 N. E. (2d)

116 (1955).

70 111. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 101.36(e).
71 9 I1. App. (2d) 422, 133 N. E. (2d) 753 (1956).
denied.
72 6 I.

App. (2d)

571. 128 N.

E.

(2d)

602 (1955).

Leave to appeal has been
Leave to appeal has been

denied.
73 8 Ill. App. (2d) 442. 131, N. B. (2d) 796 (1956). The earlier proceedings in
the case may be noted at 3 Ill. App. (2d) 112, 120 N. E. (2d) 381 (1954).
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notice needed, following an appeal, before the trial court should
be permitted to reinstate the case and proceed with a new trial
or hearing therein to be conducted pursuant to the mandate or
direction of the reviewing tribunal. The Civil Practice Act purports to specify that, upon the filing of the mandate, the cause
shall be reinstated "upon ten days' notice being given to the
adverse party or his attorney. ' 74 Actually, in that case, the
notice as to the filing of the mandate and for reinstatement of
the cause was not in excess of three days from its date although
the trial court took no action thereon other than to permit the
filing and to schedule a rehearing date which fell more than ten
days after the date of the notice but shorter than ten days from
the day on which the reinstatement order was entered. Following
judgment on rehearing, the appellant again sought review, this
time contending that the new judgment was void on the theory
that the prescribed notice was essential to give the trial court
renewed jurisdiction over the person of the appellant. The
Appellate Court for the First District, after noting a line of
decisions which have provided a series of confusing results in
this respect, reached the conclusion that the statutory notice was
not a jurisdictional feature hence the failure to give a full ten-day
75
notice made the new judgment no worse than voidable.
ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS

It could be considered appropriate, in closing this portion of
the survey, to note that the Supreme Court, in the only case of
significance relating to the enforcement of judgments, the case
of Smith v. Carlson,6 took a long step forward in clarification
of the procedural methods involved in the revival of a dormant
judgment. The holder of such a judgment may, if he wishes,
institute a separate action in debt for the purpose of giving
74 Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 88(2).
75 The Supreme Court, on certificate of importance but not in the period of this
survey, later affirmed the holding so achieved when it indicated that Section 88(2)
of the Civil Practice Act was no more than directory in its operation: 9 Ill. (2d)
311, 137 N. E. (2d) 360 (1956).
768 ]li. (2d) 74, 135 N. E. (2d) 513 (1966), noted in 34 C1TCAGo-KmnT LAW
R vrEw 257, reversing 6 l. App. (2) 271, 127 N. E. (2d) 257 (1955).
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renewed effect to the old judgment 77 but he is also free to pursue
the common-law remedy, by way of a writ of scire facias issued
in the original proceeding, if this would serve his purpose. 7 A
difference in the language of the applicable limitation statute as
to the former,7 9 when compared with common law concepts regulating the use of scire facias, had led the Appellate Court for the
First District to conclude that, while the mere institution of the
separate action in debt would be enough to prevent the bar of
limitation from operating, it was essential, for this purpose, to
carry the scire facias proceeding to completion before the dormant
judgment had actually expired, otherwise the attempted revival
would be ineffective. The Supreme Court, following the granting
of leave to appeal, reached an opposite result when it concluded
that there was no legitimate reason for differing rules in this
respect and that the simple institution of either type of proceeding would be sufficient, if begun in ample time, to permit of the
eventual revival of the judgment.
IV. CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
In the area of substantive criminal law, the only case of
consequence is that of People v. Riggins1 in which the Supreme
Court was called upon to interpret a special statute relating to
embezzlement.2 Therein, the defendant, a collection agent, entered
into an agreement to collect the delinquent accounts of the prosecuting witness and was given the right to deduct his commissions
from the amounts collected. Upon being prosecuted for failure
to remit the balance of the sums collected to the prosecuting
witness, the defendant argued that he could not be convicted of
embezzlement since he had an interest in the money. By way of
77

Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 55.

78 Ibid., Ch. 83, § 24b.
79 Ibid., Ch. 83, § 24b, states that a civil action "may be brought" upon the judgment "within twenty years next after the date of such judgment" and not after
that time.
18 Ii. (2d) 78, 132 N. E. (2d) 519 (1956). Schaefer, J. filed a dissenting opinion
in which Klngbeil and Maxwell, JJ. concurred, which appears at 8 Il. (2d) 78.
132 N. E. (2d) 928.
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 210.

